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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions (Subcommittee) of the
Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA) published a report on
legal opinion practice in corporate transactions where a Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) licensee is one of the parties.' The FCBA Re-
port consists of suggested language for opinions, accompanied by com-
mentary explaining the recommended interpretation of the language.
The Subcommittee's foreword describes the FCBA Report as an
"attempt[] to reach a consensus on the scope and language of opinions in
. .* ,,2
FCC-related transactions. According to the Subcommittee, the FCBA
Report is designed to facilitate negotiation and interpretation of legal
opinions issued by communications lawyers.3 "Inspired ' 4 by the efforts of
the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) to de-
velop the Legal Opinion Accord,5 the FCBA Report cites the ABA Accord,
1. Report of the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of the Transactional Practice
Committee of the Federal Communications Bar Association, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 389
(1996) [hereinafter FCBA Report]. The FCBA Report reflects the views of the Subcommit-
tee's six members, who received comments from the FCBA's Transactional Practice Com-
mittee and other practitioners; the FCBA Report does not necessarily reflect the views of the
FCBA.
2. Id. at 390.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Committee on Legal Opinions, Third Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the
Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus.
LAW. 167 (1991) [hereinafter ABA Accord]. Pages 224 to 232 of the ABA Accord contain
"Certain Guidelines for the Negotiation and Preparation of Third-Party Legal Opinions"
and are sometimes referred to collectively herein as the ABA Guidelines. See infra Part
HII.A. The ABA Accord was inspired, in turn, by the publication of, and response to, James
J. Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-an Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of
Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW. 915 (1973). The task of examining legal opinion customary
practice has also been undertaken by the TriBar Opinion Committee (TriBar). The most re-
cent work by TriBar is Third-Party "Closing" Opinions, 53 Bus. LAW. 591 (1998)
[hereinafter TriBar Report]. The Practicing Law Institute held a seminar in May of 1998
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particularly its assumptions and definitions, as "a very helpful guide for
communications opinions."6
This Article responds to the Subcommittee's request for comments
on the FCBA Report.7 After a brief background on the role of legal opin-
ions in corporate transactions generally, the major sections of the FCBA
Report are analyzed, assessing whether it accomplishes its goals and com-
paring it to the ABA Accord and the more recent TriBar Report, which pre-
sents an exhaustive treatment of legal opinion customary practice. In car-
rying out this analysis, the Article argues that legal opinions add value to
corporate transactions only when a lawyer is the least-cost provider of the
information sought. Lawyers should not act as insurers or guarantors of
corporate transactions;8 to ask lawyers to do so unnecessarily raises the
costs of consummating corporate transactions. The Article concludes that
the FCBA Report diverges in many cases from the ABA Accord and the
TriBar Report without adequate explanation and imposes opinion obliga-
tions in many instances where a lawyer is not the least-cost provider of the
requested information.
II. LEGAL OPINION PRACTICE
A. The Purpose of Legal Opinions
Parties to business transactions frequently look to legal counsel for
assurance that the transaction documents are enforceable and comply with
applicable laws. Typically, a lawyer delivers an opinion to a party or par-
ties to the transaction other than the lawyer's client. For example, where
the lawyer represents the seller, the lawyer ordinarily gives a legal opinion
to a buyer, underwriter, or investor. As such, legal opinions simply provide
following the publication of the TriBar Report entitled Legal Opinions: The Impact of the
TriBar Committee's New Report on Legal Opinion Practice (co-chairs Arthur Norman Field
& Donald W. Glazer). The course materials were published by the Practicing Law Institute
under the same title and contain much useful material for the study of legal opinion prac-
tice. Another useful source for information about legal opinion practice is the recently pub-
lished Mortgage Loan Opinion Report, which relies heavily on the TriBar Report and the
ABA Accord in its examination of legal opinions in commercial mortgage loan transactions
and contains a selected bibliography of legal opinion reports. 54 Bus. LAW. 119 (1998).
6. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 392.
7. Id.
8. See ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 171, 227, para. I.B(2). See also TriBar Report,
supra note 5, at 608.
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comfort to the parties to the transaction that the law will not prevent the
transaction from being consummated.9
Given the highly technical nature of the FCC's regulatory frame-
work, opinion recipients in FCC-regulated transactions often are not satis-
fied with a general opinion from the company's counsel, which ordinarily
is assumed not to address specialized areas of law such as communications
regulations. Instead, recipients seek specific assurance that execution, de-
livery, and performance of the transaction documents will not violate the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications Act), and re-
quest that a communications practitioner deliver this opinion. Opinion re-
cipients have also requested communications lawyers to opine on numer-
ous other regulatory matters, such as the status of FCC licenses, FCC
proceedings, and compliance by the company with FCC regulations. By
their very nature, these opinions require extensive knowledge of factual
matters (e.g., whether internal FCC procedures were properly followed
when issuing a license or whether the company has violated any FCC
regulations in operating its business) and may require the opinion giver to
address matters that have little to do with his or her legal training. These
requests for nonlegal (i.e., factual) opinions raise questions as to the un-
derlying purpose of legal opinions. Why are lawyers asked to opine as to
certain legal or factual matters in connection with corporate transactions?
Who, if anyone, benefits from these opinions?
One answer is that lawyers often times are the least-cost provider of
the information sought.1° For example, counsel to seller in a sale of assets
is best able to opine as to whether the purchase agreement has been duly
authorized and is enforceable against seller in accordance with its terms.
For counsel to buyer to answer this legal question through due diligence
would require him or her to duplicate work that seller's counsel likely has
already undertaken. Similarly, in the context of an underwritten offering of
securities, counsel to seller is best able to determine the capitalization of
seller and whether the issuance of the securities will violate any provisions
of seller's charter or bylaws. To ask counsel to the underwriter to confirm
9. For a discussion of legal opinion practice from a corporate lawyer's perspective,
see JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NE-
GOTIATING CORPORATE AcQuisITIONS § 8.4 (1975).
10. The role of lawyers and legal opinions in corporate transactions was explored in
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Professor Gilson argued that "most of the matters on which legal
opinions are required reflect the superiority of the.., lawyer as an information producer."
Id. at 275. See also Lou R. KLING & EILEEN NUGENT SIMON, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 14.09 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
[Vol. 51
Number 3] LEGAL OPINIONS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
this legal conclusion through due diligence would duplicate the work of
seller's counsel.
Although a legal opinion may be viewed as the least-cost source of
information in corporate transactions, practically speaking, an opinion may
serve other less value-enhancing purposes. For example, a legal opinion
might be viewed as insurance (in the form of damages for malpractice or
negligence) provided by the firm or lawyer giving the opinion. To the ex-
tent that legal opinions operate as insurance, opinion practice arguably
subtracts value from corporate transactions; law firms and lawyers are not
in the business of providing insurance and to ask them to do so merely
adds unnecessary costs to doing deals.'
One use of legal opinions is undeniably efficient-when the lawyer is
the only source of the information sought. Specifically, because lawyers
have a state-sanctioned monopoly for the practice of law, to the extent that
a legal opinion addresses a purely legal issue, only a lawyer can give the
opinion. Accordingly, requesting an opinion from a lawyer concerning a
purely legal issue is an efficient and appropriate use of a legal opinion. Ar-
guably, legal opinions add value to corporate transactions only when the
lawyer is the least-cost provider of the information. Because lawyers have
a monopoly on pure legal opinions, they are by definition the least-cost
producers of such opinions.
2
B. Recent Trends
Delivering overly expansive legal opinions should be of particular
concern to lawyers in light of recent case law suggesting that legal opinion
practice can expose a lawyer to serious risk of liability. This risk is height-
ened when the facts upon which the opinion giver relied turn out to be
false; courts have shown an increasing willingness to disregard opinion
11. Reflecting these conclusions, title insurance has largely replaced legal opinions as
to title in real estate transactions. For a discussion of the several factors leading to the ubiq-
uity of title insurance, see Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and Inter-Professional
Competitive Advantage: An Example Drawn from Residential Real Estate Conveyancing,
62 Mo. L. REV. 241 (1997). Title insurance companies are experts in providing insurance;
they spread the risk that any one title insurance policy will be inaccurate. Law firms are not
in the insurance business and probably do not become involved in sufficient numbers of
corporate transactions to spread the risk that any one legal opinion will prove incorrect and
subject the lawyer or firm to exposure. Accordingly, to use a legal opinion as an insurance
policy is an inefficient use of a lawyer's skills.
12. One other purpose has been suggested for legal opinions: internalizing the costs to
lawyers who attempt to place "traps" in an agreement. Thomas L. Ambro & J. Truman
Bidwell, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Economics of Legal Opinions, 1989 COLuM. Bus. L.
REv. 307, 314 ("A firm, knowing that it must provide an enforceability opinion, may be
less likely to attempt to place 'traps' in the contract in an attempt to give its client an edge
in future dealings.").
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givers' qualifying statements and to hold them liable to nonclients for er-
roneous statements.
13
Several recent cases illustrate this trend. Kline v. First Western Gov-
ernment Securities, Inc., for example, was an appeal of a summary judg-
ment in favor of the opinion giver where the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
affirmative misrepresentations and material omissions in three legal opin-
ions given to a securities dealer.14 The opinions addressed the tax treatment
of gains and losses incurred by investors in forward contracts. 5
The opinions were addressed to the dealer, not to the investors, and
contained the following extensive disclaimers: (1) the opinions are predi-
cated on facts supplied by the client, are assumed to be true, and have not
been independently verified; (2) the opinions are for the personal use of
the client (i.e., the securities dealer) only, and are not to be relied on by
anyone else; (3) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and courts likely will
challenge the stance taken by the opinion; and (4) the opining attorneys
express no opinion about the advisability of the transaction to any particu-
lar investor because to do so would be "impossible" without knowing the
"individual facts and circumstances affecting the particular taxpayer."'
6
Plaintiffs invested in forward contracts, incurred losses, and deducted
these losses on their income tax filings. The IRS subsequently disallowed
the deductions. Plaintiffs argued that the legal opinions made material mis-
representations and omitted material facts concerning the actual structure
of the transactions. In reality, the facts supplied by the dealer to counsel
did not accurately portray the substance of the "forward contracts" scheme.
Thus, the legal opinion was in some sense "hypothetical"; that is, counsel
may have reached an accurate legal conclusion with respect to the facts
supplied by the client, but those facts bore an inaccurate resemblance to
13. See Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney's Liability, to One Other than Immediate
Client, for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R.4th 615, 625 (1988 &
Supp. 1996); Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient Third Parties-
at What Cost?, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 13 (1989); TriBar Report, supra note 5, at
604 n.29.
14. Kline, 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994).
15. Forward contracts are contracts to purchase or sell a specified security at a desig-
nated interest rate on a fixed future date.
16. Kline, 24 F.3d at 482-83. Two other facts should be noted about Kline. First, coun-
sel to the dealer had represented its principals for many years prior to the creation of the
"forward contracts" investment scheme and may have been involved in the development of
the scheme. Second, counsel was put on notice numerous times that, despite its many dis-
claimers, investors apparently were obtaining and relying upon counsel's legal opinion in
making their investment decisions. However, counsel did not encourage this reliance by
investors.
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the underlying transactions into which investors, including plaintiffs, en-
tered.
The Third Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the opinion giver on the omissions claim and upheld the• • • 17
denial of summary judgment on the misrepresentation claim. It ruled that
the investors had standing to sue and could have reasonably relied on the
opinion despite the disclaimers contained in the opinion. The court deter-
mined that, due to counsel's alleged "long and close relationship" with the
dealer, it may well have known that the facts that the client provided were
not a complete and accurate description of the transactions. The court fur-
ther determined that when a law firm has "good reason to know" that the
facts provided are materially inaccurate or incomplete, "it cannot escape
liability simply by including in an opinion letter a statement that its opin-
•,,18
ion is based on provided facts. Finally, the court held that reliance by
investors like plaintiffs, notwithstanding the letter's express limitations,
may have been reasonable because counsel knew the legal opinion was
being distributed to investors. The court concluded that both the misrepre-
sentation and omission claims by plaintiffs should be tried and remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Greenberg responded that "the
majority effectively holds that no matter how thoroughly a law firm con-
ditions its opinion, it may be liable... for misrepresentation and omis-
sions.""9 He stated:
In the face of [plaintiffs'] claim, I ask the rhetorical question: how can
an investor reasonably rely on opinion letters to anticipate favorable
tax treatment when they: (1) are addressed to someone else; (2) are by
their terms only for the use of someone else; (3) by their terms cannot
be shown to the investor; (4) are predicated on facts not supplied by
the author of the letters; (5) warn that the IRS likely will challenge the
claim for favorable treatment as it has in similar situations; (6) explain
the basis for the challenge; (7) state that the courts might take a strong
stance contrary to the opinion; and (8) flatly announce that it is
"impossible" for the author of the letter "to express an opinion as to
the deductibility of any particular loss incurred by" an investor? The
answer is obvious. The investors could not rely reasonably on such
letters, and thus [counsel] is entitled to summary judgment on the Sec-
tion 10(b) claims. In my view, nothing could be clearer.2
17. Id. at481.
18. Id. at 487.
19. Id. at 499 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 498 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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A few harsh lessons emerge from Kline. First, correct legal conclu-
sions are not a complete shield from liability for an opinion giver, who
may be held accountable for a client's misrepresentations. Second, no
matter how specifically, repeatedly, and clearly stated a disclaimer is, it
may not be a sufficient basis for avoiding a trial on the merits. Thus, at
least in those cases where an opinion giver has an ongoing relationship
with a client, a disclaimer concerning "no independent investigation of
facts" may be ineffective to avoid an evidentiary inquiry as to the lawyer's
actual knowledge. Third, attempting to limit use of the legal opinion solely
to the client's purposes may have no effect, especially where counsel is on
notice that third parties are relying on the legal opinion.
In another recent case, Petrillo v. Bachenberg, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court confirmed this trend toward expanded liability of lawyers toS 21
noncients. In Petrillo, the court concluded that an attorney may be held
liable for negligent compilation of an environmental report that he had
given to a realtor in connection with an earlier transaction. The attorney's
office had prepared a composite including some, but not all, tests per-
formed by an engineering firm on land the client wanted to sell. The real-
tor was unsuccessful in selling the land, but he ultimately bought the land
at an auction. He then sold the land to the plaintiff after giving her the en-
vironmental report without the attorney's knowledge. When plaintiff's
tests revealed environmental damage, she sued the attorney of the original
seller for not including all the tests in the composite report.
Although the trial court directed a verdict for the attorney, holding
that he had no duty to the second buyer (plaintiff), the appellate court re-
versed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that attorneys owe a
duty to all nonclients who they should foresee may rely on their profes-
sional opinions or promises. 2 According to the court, the attorney should
have foreseen that the realtor would give the report to a potential seller
who might rely on it as a complete compilation, and that, because the at-
torney represented the realtor in the second transaction, the plaintiff was
not too remote from the attorney to rely on the report.2
3
Noting the trial court's finding that the attorney was unaware that the
report was given to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff testified that she in
fact did not rely on the report in purchasing the property, dissenting Judge
Garibaldi vigorously disagreed that the harm was foreseeable and that the
attorney owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. He wrote:
21. Petrillo, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995).
22. Id. at 1358.
23. Id. at 1361-62.
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Under the majority's opinion, an attorney may owe a professional duty
to non-clients to oversee the care used in collating pages from their
law office files. While an attorney should not be exempt from the need
to exercise the same ordinary care that others do with respect to non-
professional functions such as this, there should be no special duty
arising from the fact that the source of this information is an attorney.
... Although attorneys may be liable to non-clients for their own pro-
fessional work, they are not and should not be guarantors of the accu-
racy of surveys or other similar experts' reports that they merely
transmit.
24
A third recent decision provides additional evidence of a trend to-
ward liability to nonclients for misrepresentations of fact. In Mehaffy,
Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, counsel for the town of
Winter Park, Colorado, provided plaintiff, a purchaser of municipal notes,
with opinion letters erroneously concluding that a pending lawsuit against
the town had no merit.25 The Colorado appellate court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim, despite the fact
that it recognized that ex pressions of opinion generally cannot support a
misrepresentation claim. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Colorado
determined that the attorneys could be liable for negligent misrepresenta-
tion of fact (specifically, by not investigating whether certain required
hearings had been held). The supreme court further ruled that the plaintiff
may have relied on the alleged misrepresentation even though plaintiff had
submitted a letter to the town stating that it was relying on its own investi-
gation of all material facts relating to the transaction. Referring to the
majority opinion, dissenting Judge Rovira wrote, "[w]hile counsel was
aware that the opinions would be relied upon to evaluate the merit of the
existing lawsuit and the risk of harm, nowhere ... does [the record] indi-
24. Id. at 1366 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
25. Mehaffy, 892 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995).
26. The court cited Van Leeuwan v. Nuzzi, 810 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Colo. 1993)
(misrepresentation claim generally cannot be based on expression of opinion) and Chacon
v. Scavo, 358 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1960). "[R]epresentations as to whether certain lots were us-
able as building sites required an interpretation of the relevant city ordinances, and were not
actionable because they were representations of law." Mehaffy, 892 P.2d at 237 (citing
Chacon, 358 P.2d 614). See also Laurie G. Goldstein & Steven 0. Weise, Liabilities for
Issuing Opinion Letters, in LEGAL OPMIIONs-AccoRD OR DIscORD 4 (ABA Section of Bus.
Law ed., 1992), citing Kirsch v. Duryea, 578 P.2d 935, 938 (Cal. 1978) ("The attorney is
not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice; he is not ... an insurer of the
soundness of his opinions .... "); ScoTr FrizGiBBON & DONALD W. GLAZER, FrrZGIBBON
& GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS § 1.3.2, at 9 (1992 & Supp. 1999) ("Lawyers may be liable
for negligence, but they are not liable merely for being wrong.").
27. Mehaffy, 892 P.2d at 238-39.
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cate that counsel knew the purpose of the oinion was to transform them
from advisors to insurers" of the investment.
Given the lessons of these cases-particularly the ineffectiveness of
disclaimers and the expanding duty to third parties-it is incumbent upon
opinion givers to limit legal opinions to matters about which they have
knowledge and to resist unreasonable demands for opinions that convert
them into insurers .29 From an economic perspective, this means limiting
legal opinions solely to legal issues where the opinion giver is clearly the
least-cost source of the information sought.
Ill. TlE LEGAL OPINION ACCORD AND THE TRIBAR REPORT
A. The ABA Accord and ABA Guidelines
The ABA Accord, an illustrative opinion letter incorporating it, and
the ABA Guidelines together constitute the Third Party Legal Opinion Re-
port, adopted by the ABA's Council of the Business Law Section in 1991.
The ABA Accord resulted from two years of drafting and revising by "a
representative group of [seventy-one] knowledgeable practitioners" in
conjunction with comments solicited from the Business Law Section's
60,000 members.30 The ABA Accord was designed as "the first step toward
the establishment of a national consensus as to the purpose, format and
coverage of a third-party legal opinion, the precise meaning of its language
and the recognition of certain guidelines for its negotiation.
' 3
'
The drafters of the ABA Accord styled the set of recommended opin-
ions as an accord so that attorneys could, with necessary modifications, in-
corporate it or request it as the legal opinion to be used in their transac-
tions, thereby saving drafting and negotiating time, as well as the costs of
• ° 32
litigation over interpretation. The ABA Accord is accompanied by a glos-
28. Id. at 243 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
29. Other jurisdictions have also expanded lawyers' duties to nonclients. See, e.g.,
Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, 900 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1995) (holding that in-
tended beneficiaries of a lawyer's services, even though they were not clients of the lawyer,
have a cause of action for malpractice against the lawyer if, among other things, the harm to
the plaintiffs was "foreseeable"); Kirkland Const. Co. v. James, 658 N.E.2d 699 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a lawyer owes a duty to a nonclient who he or she reasonably
can foresee will rely on the lawyer's services).
30. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 169. See also A.N. Field, The ABA Opinion Report's
Influence on Non-Accord Opinions, in LEGAL OPINIONS-AccoRD OR DISCORD ch. 7 (ABA
Sec. of Bus. Law ed., 1992).
31. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 169.
32. Id. See also Stanley Keller, The ABA Legal Opinion Accord: A Critical Commen-
tary, in BusINEss OPINIONS 1992: THE USE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABA AccoRD AND
GUIDELINES 385 (Prac. L. Inst. Apr.-May 1992).
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sary, and each section has a separate commentary and technical note pro-
viding guidance on interpretation of the particular section. The ABA Ac-
cord is designed as an "opt-in" set of default rules. Thus, the ABA Accord
governs only those opinions that expressly adopt it.
Based on a 1995 survey by the ABA's Committee on Legal Opinions,
few attorneys apparently have invested the time necessary to study the
ABA Accord in the detail required to give or receive an ABA Accord opin-
33ion. Of those firms that had offered an ABA Accord opinion that was re-
jected, the reason stated was "not familiar" or "too complicated" in sev-
enty-nine of ninety-four responses 4 On the other hand, the great majority
view the ABA Accord as authoritative: 79 percent responded that they use
the ABA Accord as a "normative guide" in asking for and giving opin-
ions.35
The ABA Guidelines, which accompany the ABA Accord, represent,
in the view of the ABA Accord's drafters, "a sound and fair basis... for
the negotiation and preparation of third-party legal opinions. 36 Unlike the
ABA Accord, which, as noted above, was intended to be an "opt-in" set of
default rules, the ABA Guidelines were written to apply generally to all
opinion practice, regardless of whether the ABA Accord was adopted in the
particular transaction at issue. Although the ABA Accord "has not gained
the national acceptance the [Committee on Legal Opinions of the ABA]
had hoped," the ABA Guidelines "are frequently looked to for guidance re-
garding customary legal opinion practice. ' 37 They were drawn from cus-
33. In an effort to document the ABA Accord's use and reputation, the ABA's Com-
mittee on Legal Opinions surveyed law firms across the country in 1995. Committee on Le-
gal Opinions of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association, Results of
June 1995 Survey on Use of Legal Opinion Accord [hereinafter Survey]. Some responses
do not total 100% because not all questions were answered. Of the 109 firms that re-
sponded, 13 give ABA Accord opinions "regularly," 55 give them "sometimes," and 36 had
never given an ABA Accord opinion. Id. The relatively low number of firms that report
regularly giving ABA Accord opinions may reflect dissatisfaction not with the ABA Ac-
cord's content, but with its length and complexity. See Joel I. Greenberg, Third Party Legal
Opinions Under ABA Accord, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 1993, at 1; Michael Gruson, The Reme-
dies Opinion in International Transactions, 27 INT'L LAW. 911, 915 (1993).
34. Survey, supra note 33, at 2. The other responses were: "favors Opinion Giver" (15)
and "favors Opinion Recipient" (1). Multiple responses were allowed.
35. Id. The fact that the ABA Accord remains one of the 10 most frequently used publi-
cations of the ABA is testimony to its continued influence. See ABA, ABA Publishing
(visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/abapubs/home.html>.
36. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 224.
37. Legal Opinion Principles, 53 Bus. LAw. 831, 831 (1998) [hereinafter Legal Opin-
ion Principles]. The Legal Opinion Principles, which were also published by the Commit-
tee on Legal Opinions of the ABA and comprise just two pages of maxims regarding legal
opinion practice, are generally consistent with the ABA Guidelines and the TriBar Report.
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tom and offered as principles to which all legal opinion practice should
adhere."
Some of the more important and relevant ABA Guidelines are:
[1.] Scope and Coverage. [T]he proper purpose of a third-party le-
gal opinion is to assist in the Opinion Recipient's diligence. It
is not to transform the Opinion Giver into a surety for the Cli-
ent ....
[2.] Legal and Factual Matters. Legal opinions should be... lim-
ited to questions of law and questions requiring legal judgment.
• . . [Any opinion that requires interpretation of financial
statements, economic forecasts, engineering and environmental
reports or appraisal opinions should not be requested. Although
lawyers may furnish comment as to matters of fact, such as in-
formation concerning the existence of pending or threatened
legal proceedings, they may wish to provide that comment...
in the form of a confirmation ....
[3.] Comprehensive Legal Compliance. It is generally inappropriate
for the Opinion Recipient to request an opinion to the effect
that . . . the Client is in compliance with all applicable
(material) laws, possesses all necessary licenses and permits
and satisfies all similar regulatory requirements .... 41
[4.] Negative Assurance. In a Transaction involving the offering
and sale of securities of the Client, a negative assurance (e.g.,
based upon [our participation in drafting the Transaction
documents, involvement in the Transaction negotiations, etc.],
nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe...)
... is often provided by the Opinion Giver .... Negative as-
surance regarding relevant legal or factual aspects of other
types of transactions should not be requested.42
[5.] Quitclaims. Upon occasion, the Opinion Recipient will request
confirmation that the Opinion Giver, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of any investigation ... has no knowledge as to one or
more legal or factual matters ... that would be unfavorable. It
is not useful for the Opinion Giver to provide this type of
empty assurance . . . even though appropriately limited by a
38. Numerous articles, treatises, and state bar associations refer to the ABA Guidelines
as authority. See, e.g., FrrzGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 26, at xxxvi; Michael Gruson,
Legal Opinions: Response to the American Bar Association's Opinion Accord, in IN-
TERNAUONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 391 (Prac. L. Inst. 1993); State Bar of Texas,
Business Law Section, Report of the Legal Opinions Committee Regarding Legal Opinions
in Business Transactions, 29 BuLLETIN 1 (1992).
39. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 227, para. I.B(2).
40. Id. at 224, para. I.A(l).
41. Id. at 228, para. I.B(5).
42. Id. at 228, para. I.B(6).
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broadly-worded disclaimer; accordingly, this type of assurance
should not be requested.
43
[6.] Litigation Evaluation. Evaluations of the possible outcome of
pending or threatened litigation, individually or in the aggre-
gate, should not normally be requested.
44
These ABA Guidelines highlight principles that are consistent with
the economic approach to legal opinions. First, the ABA Guidelines state
that legal opinions should not be used to transform the opinion giver into a
surety or guarantor for the client. As noted above,45 lawyers ought not to be
in the business of providing insurance to third parties for their clients in
connection with transactions. Requiring lawyers to do so needlessly raises
the cost of consummating corporate transactions. Second, the ABA Guide-
lines state that legal opinions should be limited to questions requiring legal
judgment.46 As noted above,4 7 the best example of where a lawyer is the
least-cost provider of information is where the lawyer is exercising legal
judgment; lawyers have a licensed monopoly on legal judgments, and thus,
there is no less expensive means of acquiring the information. Third, the
ABA Guidelines recognize that, in very limited circumstances, a lawyer
may be the least-cost provider of certain factual information for purely
practical reasons.48 The ABA Guidelines, however, recommend that law-
yers commenting on matters of fact should provide such comments in the
form of a confirmation. 49 Providing the information in the form of a con-
firmation rather than a legal opinion properly reinforces the economic no-
tion that lawyers ought not certify facts in legal opinions and should only
address those factual matters as to which they are the least-cost source of
the information.
B. The TriBar Report
The TriBar Report is the latest effort of the TriBar Opinion Commit-
tee (TriBar) to provide guidance as to customary practice in giving and re-
ceiving legal opinions. ° The TriBar Report synthesizes recent legal opin-
ion literature, changes in corporate law and practice, and developments in
43. Id. at 228, para. I.B(7).
44. Id. at 229, para. I.C(4).
45. See supra notes 8 and 11 and accompanying text.
46. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 224, para. I.A(1). See generally TriBar Report, supra
note 5, at 608-19.
47. See supra Part II.A.
48. For example, a lawyer is a likely source of information regarding the existence of
litigation. See ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 224, para. I.A(1).
49. Id.
50. TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 592.
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• . . 51legal opinion practice. The TriBar Report is, according to TriBar, gener-
52
ally consistent with the ABA Guidelines. The goal of the TriBar Report is
to provide guidance on customary legal opinion practice, both as to the
language used in opinion letters as well as the factual and legal investiga-
tion required to support particular opinions.53
A section-by-section analysis of the FCBA Report follows, which is
based on the Accord (and ABA Guidelines), which inspired the FCBA Re-
port, and on the more recent TriBar Report, which was issued two years
after the FCBA Report. As will be apparent, the authors of the FCBA Re-
port in many respects have chosen not to follow the approach of the ABA
Accord and the TriBar Report. In addition, in many cases where the FCBA
Report diverges from the ABA Accord and the TriBar Report, the FCBA
Report has chosen an inefficient position with respect to the use and scope
of legal opinions in corporate transactions regulated by the FCC.
IV. NON-TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC OPINIONS
A. FCBA Report, Paragraph L.A Licenses Held
The FCBA Report offers two alternative formulations of the "licenses
held" opinion often requested in FCC-related legal opinions. These two
formulations are discussed in turn.
Option 1:
The Company holds the FCC licenses, permits, and authorizations
specified on Exhibit A (the "FCC Licenses").5
The Subcommittee states in its commentary on the "licenses held"
opinion that "[i]n normal cases, the opinion requires that counsel confirm
that the relevant file records for each FCC license reflect the Company as
the holder .... 5 Typically, to determine whether a company holds certain
licenses, an attorney instructs a legal assistant to review the publicly avail-
able records at the FCC.5' This task presents no exercise of professional
51. Id. at 593.
52. Id. at 593 n.3.
53. Id. at 595.
54. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 393.
55. Id. at 394.
56. Because the FCC does not ordinarily send copies of licenses when issued to attor-
neys and a client may have obtained licenses without the attorney's assistance, an opinion
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judgment or resolution of a question of law requiring a lawyer's skill and
training. Instead, the opinion giver is being asked to make a highly factual
determination. This observation about the "licenses held" opinion immedi-
ately suggests that the opinion is economically inefficient; the opinion in-
volves little, if any, legal judgment, and the lawyer is being asked to cer-
tify facts as to which he or she likely is not the least-cost source of the
information. As the ensuing discussion demonstrates, the "licenses held"
opinion almost certainly creates unnecessary costs in FCC-regulated trans-
actions.
Despite its acknowledgment that the "licenses held" opinion requires
reliance on FCC records, the Subcommittee recognizes the "vagaries of the
FCC's public reference rooms" and states that the FCC's records can be
"incomplete." 57 Given this observation, it is difficult to understand why the
Subcommittee considers licenses held to be the proper subject of a legal
opinion. Attorneys have no control over the FCC reference rooms and
rarely can rely on a reference rooms search to be conclusive evidence of
anything. The highly unreliable set of facts with which an opinion giver is
presented when giving a "licenses held" opinion, coupled with the factual
nature of the determination, suggests that the opinion giver is not the least-
cost source of information. In addition, given the lessons of recent case
law discussed above,5 practitioners who give such "licenses held" opin-
ions, knowing that the facts upon which they are relying may be highly in-
accurate, risk exposure to legal malpractice liability. Accordingly, the
"licenses held" opinion is not an appropriate subject for legal opinions.
Given the realities of public record keeping generally, the ABA Ac-
cord, unlike the FCBA Report, presumes that "all official public records
(including their proper indexing and filing) are accurate and complete. ' 9
Likewise, the TriBar Report asserts that "[a] public official is assumed to
understand (and to have undertaken the appropriate diligence to support)
the statement of ultimate fact (conclusion of law) contained in [a] certifi-
cate.' '60 These assumptions likely reflect a recognition that an opinion, such
as a "licenses held" opinion, would necessarily expose an attorney to li-
ability for mistakes by government clerks. This exposure is inconsistent
with the premise of the ABA Accord and the TriBar Report that the opinion
61giver should not become an insurer or guarantor of the transaction. In
giver's files would not be a reliable source of information upon which to base the "licenses
held" opinion.
57. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 391.
58. See discussion supra Part II.B.
59. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 186.
60. TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 612.
61. See supra notes 8 and 11 and accompanying text.
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short, the FCBA Report's endorsement of a "licenses held" opinion is in-
consistent with the approach of the ABA Accord and the TriBar Report.
In recommending the "licenses held" opinion, the FCBA Report does
not address its departure from the ABA Accord's presumption that public
records are accurate and complete; it considers only the issue of whether
verification of licenses requires "some legal judgment."' 62 According to the
Subcommittee, a legal opinion may be necessary because "counsel may
need to track transfers of control, renewals, and name changes., 63 It char-
acterizes this license verification process as "akin to a real estate title
search." 64
As noted above, however, attorneys today, for good reason, rarely
render real estate title opinions; rather, current practice is for purchasers to
acquire title insurance.6 ' To the extent that the Subcommittee equates veri-
fication of licenses held to a title search, it suggests that the opinion giver
is expected to act in the capacity of insurer. Given the admonition of the
ABA Accord and the TriBar Report against transforming the opinion giver
into an insurer,66 the title search analogy is inappropriate and suggests an
inefficient approach to legal opinion practice.
Opinion recipients, particularly lenders, express concern that if the
status of the licenses is not addressed by the company's counsel, they will
be unable to obtain the assurance they need to complete the transaction.
This concern may be based on the assumption that the necessary factual
investigation may be completed by reference to the files of the opinion
giver or the company. In fact, as noted above, the opinion requires exami-
nation of the FCC' s public records. Thus, the opinion giver is not the least-
cost source of the information. Lenders could hire their own counsel or re-
search service to acquire this information. It is doubtful that company
counsel is in a position to complete the requisite due diligence any more
efficiently than counsel (and legal assistants) engaged by the lender. In ad-
dition, as any attorney who has negotiated a legal opinion can attest, the
vast majority of the time spent on the legal opinion involves the particular
verbal formulation of the issues. If lenders hired their own counsel to per-
form the due diligence, these negotiating costs (which amount to a dead-
weight social loss) would be eliminated. Furthermore, lender's counsel is
62. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 393.
63. Id.
64. Id. The FCBA Report elsewhere states, however, that the "licenses held" opinion
does not require the opinion giver to address whether there have been defects in the chain of
title prior to issuance of the license to the particular licensee. Id. at 395.
65. See supra note 11.
66. See supra notes 8 and 11 and accompanying text.
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far more likely to be able to help his or her client (the lender) reach the
comfort level he or she requires to do the deal, since their interests are
aligned and they will be proceeding in a cooperative rather than adverse
67
manner.
In view of its ubiquity in current practice, however, the "licenses
held" opinion may be unavoidable for communications lawyers. If so, the
ABA Accord would suggest that the issue be approached as a factual con-
firmation rather than a legal opinion.68 The ABA Accord, for example, rec-
ommends that matters requiring no exercise of professional judgment, such
as the existence of pending litigation, should be presented not as an opin-
ion, but as a confirmation qualified by a statement describing the limited
investigation performed.69 Stating as "opinion" that the client holds certain
licenses is apt to mislead the recipient into believing that professional
judgment was exercised. Accordingly, if the matter of licenses held must
be addressed, the opinion giver should provide merely a confirmation and
should note his or her reliance on the FCC's files and the possible inade-
quacy of these files. Unfortunately, given the existence of cases like Kline,
Petrillo, and Mehaffy, opinion givers must be extremely careful to circum-
scribe their duties in such factual confirmations, and even then, they may
be subject to substantial risk.
Option 2:
The Company validly holds the FCC Licenses, permits, and
authorizations specified on Exhibit A (the '9FCC Licenses").
70
67. In addressing the issue of foreign qualification and foreign good standing of corpo-
rations in legal opinions, the TriBar Report similarly concludes that opinion practice would
be more efficient if opinion recipients undertook to obtain certain of the information they
seek directly rather than rely on the opinion giver:
Because opinion preparers customarily base foreign qualification and foreign
good standing opinions solely on certificates of government officials, which nor-
mally are presented at closing, those opinions usually add little (if anything) of
value other than confirming that the opinion preparers do not know the certifi-
cates on which the opinions are based to be unreliable. The Committee believes
that the opinion process could be streamlined without any meaningful detriment
to opinion recipients if absent special circumstances the practice of rendering for-
eign qualification and foreign good standing opinions were discontinued and
opinion recipients were to rely directly on the certificates themselves.
TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 647.
68. In this regard, the TriBar Report notes that "[s]ome opinion givers believe that
statements dealing primarily with factual matters should be referred to as 'confirmations'
rather than opinions." TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 598 n.16.
69. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 213.
70. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 394.
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As optional recommended language, the FCBA Report states thatS 71
counsel may opine that the company "validly" holds the FCC licenses.
Option 2 is identical to Option 1 except for the addition of the word
"validly." The Subcommittee does not, however, identify the circum-
stances when it believes an attorney should give the "validly holds" opin-
ion.
The Subcommittee defines "validly" to mean (1) that the FCC fol-
lowed regular FCC procedures in conformity with prior FCC practice in
licensing the company, and (2) "that there is no legal basis to conclude that
the Company cannot hold [the license] as a matter of law.' 72 Recognizing
that the term "validly" is subject to misinterpretation, the Subcommittee
suggests that attorneys may wish to avoid the term and simply address the
two enumerated issues. In the Subcommittee's view, "the addition of the
word 'validly' necessarily involves the exercise of legal judgment .... 7'
Whether opining as to "validly holds" or opining as to the two identi-
fied meanings of "validly," the opinion giver must grapple with exceed-
ingly difficult issues in the "licenses validly held" opinion. The first enu-
merated issue compels the opinion giver to evaluate whether the FCC has
acted in compliance with its own procedural rules. To make this determi-
nation, a lawyer would be required to ascertain whether agency action was
both faithful to procedures and free from taint of any kind. In contrast to
the approach of the FCBA Report, ABA Accord section 4(/) states that all
agency action is ordinarily presumed valid.74 Given the difficulty in deter-
mining whether the agency has in fact been punctilious in every respect,
the ABA Accord approach is the more reasonable.
The second enumerated issue, whether the attorney has a legal basis
to question the company's right to hold the license, would require, at a
minimum, that the opinion giver verify that the company has committed no
fraud on the agency; that the company has complied with all FCC rules
and regulations; that the company has not violated any condition on its li-
cense; and, finally, that the license is not already the subject of proceed-
ings that will lead to revocation of the license.
These verifications range far beyond what is reasonable to demand of
opinion givers. No amount of due diligence would enable the opinion giver
to reach the requisite conclusions. If a fraud has been perpetrated on the
agency, there is no reason to believe that counsel would be able to uncover
it. Whether the company is in compliance, and at all times has complied,
71. Id.
72. Id. at 395.
73. Id. at 394-95.
74. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 187.
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with FCC rules, regulations, and conditions to its license could be ascer-
tained only by continuous and pervasive monitoring of the company's fa-
cilities and activities.
In essence, the "licenses validly held" opinion is simply another way
of obtaining a "compliance with law" opinion. In a "compliance with law"
opinion, the opinion recipient asks the opinion giver to opine as to whether
the licensee is operating in compliance with the Communications Act.75 To
make this determination, the opinion giver would need to research pre-
cisely the same two enumerated issues required in order to give the
"licenses validly held" opinion (that is, whether the FCC has followed its
own internal procedures and whether the licensee has acted properly in its
dealings with the FCC). The FCBA Report, the ABA Accord, and the
TriBar Report all indicate that a "compliance with law" opinion should not
be requested, a conclusion with which this Article agrees.
7
The "licenses validly held" opinion would also require the opinion
giver to render a prediction as to the outcome of any pending license re-
newal or revocation proceedings. The ABA Accord and the TriBar Report
conclude that a prediction as to the "outcome of litigation" opinion cannot
reasonably be requested in most circumstances. Although the opinion
giver might appear to be the least-cost source of such information, the pre-
diction requires far more than the exercise of legal judgment (including the
assessment of facts that cannot be ascertained in advance by the opinion
giver) and, thus, is not the proper subject of a legal opinion.
The Subcommittee attempts to ameliorate these burdens on the
opinion giver by identifying three interpretations of the "licenses validly
held" opinion that are "erroneous" in its judgment.7 ' First, it asserts that
opinion givers should not be accountable for defects in the chain of title. 
9
Although reasonable, this conclusion is inconsistent with the Subcommit-
tee's earlier endorsement of the "licenses held" opinion as comparable to
an attorney's title opinion. More importantly, as discussed below, the
75. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 416-17.
76. See discussion infra Part VII.
77. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 229, para. I.C(4); TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 664.
78. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 395-96.
79. The Subcommittee gives the following example:
In certain services, for example, a license automatically expires if certain con-
struction or operational requirements are not satisfied by a date certain. It is theo-
retically possible that the failure by a prior licensee to comply with these require-
ments could render the license a nullity, even though no action was taken at the
time, and the license has thereafter been assigned to one or more subsequent par-
ties by final order.
Id. at 395.
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opinion giver remains responsible for opining on the regularity of the
FCC's procedures in all other respects.
Second, the FCBA Report declares that the "licenses validly held"
opinion should not be read to suggest that counsel has undertaken dili-
gence as to the licensee's compliance with law. 0 Nevertheless, the FCBA
Report directs the attorney to appropriately qualify the opinion when he or
she has "actual knowledge" of a violation by the licensee. 8' Imposition of
this duty on opinion givers is equivalent to requesting a "negative assur-
ance" opinion (i.e., that nothing has come to the attention of the opinion
giver indicating that the licensee is not in compliance with FCC rules).82
The ABA Accord approach is superior. The ABA Guidelines direct that an
implied negative assurance ordinarily should not be requested." As ABA
Guideline I.B. explains, the negative assurance opinion was developed to
assist an underwriter in establishing a due diligence defense under the Se-
curities Act of 1933, and its use should be confined to securities transac-
tions. 4
The FCBA Report also states in connection with its discussion of the
second erroneous interpretation of the "licenses validly held" opinion that
"[e]ven actual knowledge of noncompliance with operational rules of the
Commission should not render counsel unable to give this opinion in the
absence of a pending or overtly threatened proceeding to revoke the li-
cense."'85 The FCBA Report does not explain, however, why the opinion
giver should take the risk that the noncompliance could mature into a
revocation proceeding. The FCBA Report suggests, moreover, that if there
is a pending proceeding going to the company's qualifications, then "the
'validly holds' opinion is an implicit opinion that the proceeding will be
resolved in such a way that [would] not imperil the Company's holding of
the FCC license. 86 This conclusion deviates from the ABA Guidelines and
the TriBar Report, however, to the extent that it requires a prediction as to
the outcome of litigation. The FCBA Report does not explain why the
opinion giver should incur the substantial risks associated with implicit
opinions such as predictions with respect to the outcome of litigation. As
noted above, the approach of the ABA Accord and the TriBar Report is
80. Id.
81. Id. at 395-96.
82. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 228, para. I.B(6).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 228. The TriBar Report also recognizes that a negative assurance opinion
typically is limited to the securities offering context. TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 618
n.58.
85. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 396.
86. Id.
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more economically efficient as well. Although no one is better able to pre-
dict the outcome of litigation than a lawyer, the prediction simply does not
fall into the category of an opinion. A legal opinion is a professional
judgment concerning compliance or noncompliance with the law as it re-
lates to certain facts (typically corporate actions).8 The inherent uncer-
tainty of predicting the outcome of litigation is made more difficult in the
context of FCC proceedings where political or policy issues may permeate
the proceedings. In the end, predicting the outcome of litigation has very
little to do with a present legal judgment and, therefore, is not a suitable
subject for a legal opinion.
Finally, the Subcommittee proffers a third erroneous interpretation of
the "licenses validly held" opinion that is based upon the possibility that
the FCC may have misfiled and, therefore, not responded to petitions or
comments."s The FCBA Report declares without limitation that "counsel is
entitled to rely on the presumption that the Commission properly follows
its own procedures."89 This position is sensible and is consistent with ABA
Accord section 4(l) regarding the validity of agency action.' However, it is
otherwise inconsistent with the undertaking that the FCBA Report indi-
cates is required by the first prong of the definition of "validly"-that the
licenses were issued through means of regular Commission procedures.9' If
the Subcommittee intends to permit the opinion giver to rely on FCC ac-
tion only with regard to whether it addressed all petitions and comments
(and, as noted above, that there are no defects in the chain of title), it
should so clarify its FCBA Report. As indicated supra, the opinion giver
should be permitted to rely on the regularity of FCC procedures in all re-
spects, obviating the need for the "validly holds" opinion in the first place.
In addition to its effort to limit the scope of the term "validly," the
Subcommittee seeks to prescribe the due diligence that the opinion de-
mands. It concludes that the opinion giver should:
(1) review[] the licensee's ownership structure, [including] both
direct and indirect interests in the licensee, and determine[] that
no changes have taken place since Commission approval that
would have required Commission consent;
(2) [make] reasonable inquiry of the Company to ascertain the
Company's compliance with any applicable provisions of Sec-
tion 310(b) of the Communications Act concerning alien own-
87. See, e.g., TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 608.
88. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 396.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Part IV.A, Option 2.
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ership and with any applicable ownership limitations of the
rules ... ; and
(3) review[] the Commission's publicly available files and
[counsel's] own files and determine[] that no petitions or com-
ments relating to the most recent grant or assignment of the li-
cense to the Company appear that were not addressed by the
Commission.
The FCBA Report does not explain why an opinion giver may so
limit his or her due diligence, given that the opinion encompasses far more
than compliance with ownership regulation or whether the Commission
has considered all relevant pleadings. Moreover, the factual determinations
as to changes in ownership are necessarily based on client-supplied infor-
mation. Counsel in most cases will have no independent means of verify-
ing information as to changes in stockholdings or alien ownership. In pub-
lic companies, alien ownership may be ascertainable only through a
random survey of stockholders, an undertaking of considerable expense. If
this information is obtained by reliance on an officer's certificate, the
opinion becomes entirely dependent on the accuracy of the information the
attorney receives and is, in essence, the "quitclaim opinion" disfavored by
the ABA Guidelines.93 Reliance on an officer's certificate is appropriate
only if it is reasonable to do so without investigation. Given that the opin-
ion recipient seeks independent confirmation, reliance on an officer for in-
formation that goes to the heart of the opinion may be inappropriate.
Due to the almost unlimited scope of the term "validly," the resulting
unreasonable-if not impossible-due diligence requirements, the implicit
opinions, the negative assurance, the quitclaim, and the overly broad reli-
ance on client representations, a "validly holds" opinion should not be re-
quested. If compelled to provide this opinion, the opinion giver should re-
state in full the several paragraphs of qualifications in the FCBA Report.95
Yet, even if a heavily qualified opinion is accepted, cases such as Kline
warn attorneys that their disclaimers could be ignored.
92. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 396-97.
93. See ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 228. The discussion of Kline, supra Part II.B, il-
lustrates the risk to the opinion giver of reliance on client provided information. Likewise,
in Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Norwest Bank, the concurring judge wrote that,
in rendering an opinion that counsel was not aware of any liens on certain assets, reasonable
care required at least a limited investigation and that mere reliance on client-supplied in-
formation was insufficient. Greyhound Leasing, 854 F.2d 1122, 1126 (8th Cir. 1988)
(McMillian, J., concurring).
94. The TriBar Report states that opinion givers "may not rely on certifiers of fact for
statements that are tantamount to the legal opinions themselves." TriBar Report, supra note
5, at 611.
95. See FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 395-96.
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B. FCBA Report, Paragraph LB Full Force and Effect
Recommended Language:
The FCC Licenses are in full force and effect.
96
According to the FCBA Report, the "full force and effect" opinion is
intended to "complement[] and slightly overlap[] the 'Licenses Held'
opinion" and to "affirm[] that there are no limitations on the [licensee's]
ability to use the [FCC] licenses in accordance with their terms."
97
Implicitly acknowledging the numerous and far-reaching meanings of
the phrase, the Subcommittee interprets the "full force and effect" opinion
to mean only that:
(1) the orders issuing the FCC licenses have become effective un-
der 47 C.F.R. § 1.102;
(2) all express FCC-imposed conditions precedent have been satis-
fied;
(3) no stay of effectiveness has been issued; and
(4) the FCC licenses have not expired by their own terms or been
invalidated or modified by any subsequent FCC action.
98
As the FCBA Report correctly notes, this opinion does not offer a
view as to the finality or sufficiency of licenses, special conditions on the
licenses, or company compliance with the terms of the licenses; 99 each of
these issues is covered by other opinions recommended in the FCBA Re-
port. The four assurances listed above, however, may also be covered
elsewhere in the FCBA Report, by either the "licenses held" opinion (as
the Subcommittee recognizes) or the "absence of litigation" opinion. For
instance, if the orders issuing the license have not become effective, the
opinion giver will not be able to state without qualification that the com-
pany "holds" the FCC licenses. Consequently, a "full force and effect"
opinion may be redundant if a "licenses held" opinion is provided.
Given the lack of precision in the term, its overlap with other opin-
ions and because the term "full force and effect" is-like "validly"--
subject to a wide range of interpretations (including, whether the license
was "validly" issued), it should not be given. If an attorney must give this
opinion, however, its meaning should be expressly limited to issues (1),
(3), and (4) above, which are the only issues that are properly considered
to be legal issues. Issue (2) concerns whether the company in fact has sat-
96. Id. at 397.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citation omitted).
99. Id.
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isfied all conditions precedent imposed by the FCC. The company, and not
the lawyer, is the least-cost source of this factual information, and there-
fore, it should be the subject of a representation in the underlying agree-
ment, but not a legal opinion.
C. FCBA Report, Paragraph I.C Final Order
The Subcommittee notes that "[i]n [the] normal course, counsel is not
asked to opine whether the grant of all of the Company's FCC licenses has
become final."'1 The Subcommittee revisits the issue of "final order"
opinions in its discussion of transaction-specific opinions.' When dis-
cussing whether a "final order" opinion should be given with respect to a
transaction-specific opinion, the Subcommittee recommends that it should
not.' 2 The Subcommittee gives no justification for why a "final order"
opinion is unacceptable in a transaction-specific opinion yet is acceptable
here in a generic opinion. The same concerns (e.g., the fact-specific nature
of the inquiry) that arise in a transaction-specific opinion-discussed in
detail below-arise in a generic opinion, and there is no reason for the dif-
fering treatment. Accordingly, a "final order" opinion should not be given
except in the very limited circumstances discussed below with respect to
transaction-specific opinions.' 3
D. FCBA Report, Paragraph I.D Sufficiency of Licenses
Recommended Language:
First Approach:
The FCC Licenses include all FCC licenses, permits, and authori-
zations necessary for the Company to operate a [type] station on
Channel [number] in [community of license].
Second Approach:
The FCC Licenses include all FCC licenses, permits, and authori-
zations necessary for the Company to conduct its business in the
100. Id. at 398. The Subcommittee observes, however, that an opinion may be appropri-
ate when the licenses are recently issued or subject to recent controversy. Id.
101. Id. at 406.
102. Id.
103. See discussion infra Part V.
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manner in which we have been advised it is currently being con-
ducted."°4
While recognizing that counsel "should not be requested to render an
opinion... about the actual operation of the station," the Subcommittee
offers two opinions as to "sufficiency of licenses." 05 The first approach is
designed to provide "the recipient with the comfort that the FCC licenses
permit the Company to carry on its core business operations."''1 6 This
opinion would be rendered where there is a "'core' FCC license without
which one cannot lawfully carry on the business.. ." (e.g., radio and tele-
vision broadcasting).'07
Implicit in the Subcommittee's recommendation as to the first ap-
proach is the notion that an attorney can readily identify the requisite
"core" license and then determine whether the company has the necessary
authority to operate on a specific frequency at a specific location. ' 8 Since
the FCBA Report contemplates that the opinion disclaims any knowledge
as to actual station operations, the opinion giver is providing the recipient
with nothing more than information contained on the face of the license:
class of station, frequency, and location. Stating as an opinion factual in-
formation that is readily ascertainable by the opinion recipient is inappro-
priate and unnecessarily exposes the opinion giver to risk of liability due to
an overly expansive reading of the opinion. The opinion giver in this in-
stance clearly is not the least-cost source of the information sought. The
opinion recipient just as easily can obtain the information, which is the
preferred method since it obviates negotiation and, thus, reduces costs.
The first approach also could be more broadly interpreted to provide
assurance that the company is operating its facilities in conformance with
the terms of its license. Counsel could provide this opinion, however, only
by relying on factual statements of the client. Again, if an opinion is based
merely on factual information supplied by the client, the only role for
counsel in this matter appears to be the inappropriate and inefficient one of
insurer.'09
When there is no "'core' FCC license," the Subcommittee endorses
the second approach: The Company holds "all FCC licenses ... necessary
104. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 398.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 398-99.
108. Id. at 399.
109. See discussion supra Parts ll.A, I.A.
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for the ... conduct [of] its business."'10 The Subcommittee indicates that
the second approach would be inappropriate when there is a "core" FCC
license, apparently because of the technical and operational analysis that
would be required."' Nonetheless, the Subcommittee indicates that the
second approach would be appropriate for certain businesses (e.g., cable
television) where FCC licenses "are in some measure important to the op-
eration of the business."
' 2
The Subcommittee's approach diverges sharply from the approach
suggested by the ABA Guidelines. Paragraph I.B(5) states that "[i]t is gen-
erally inappropriate... to request an opinion to the effect that, in the own-
ership of its properties and the conduct of its business, the Client is in
compliance with all applicable (material) laws, [and] possesses all neces-
sary licenses and permits ... ."' " While the FCBA Report tacitly rejects
the ABA Guidelines' approach, it recognizes the extensive factual analysis
required to determine what licenses are "necessary" and suggests that the
attorney prepare a questionnaire for the company.14 Given the complexity
of the technical facilities and operations of companies in the telecommuni-
cations industry, the scope of any such questionnaire would itself be un-
duly broad.1" 5 More importantly, designing questionnaires and interpreting
responses to them are not tasks best suited to a lawyer's professional skills.
Such tasks are, however, appropriately undertaken by the company itself
and may, therefore, be the proper subject of a representation and warranty
in the underlying agreement.
Both the first and second approach should be deleted from the FCBA
Report's recommended opinion. The sufficiency of the client's licenses
simply is not the proper subject of a legal opinion.
E. FCBA Report, Paragraph LE Conditions on Licenses
Recommended Language:
110. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 398.
111. In that connection, the FCBA Report refers to its commentary explaining why a
"compliance with law" opinion should not be given. Id. at 399.
112. Id.
113. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 228, para. I.B(5) (emphasis added). The TriBar Re-
port's admonition that "opinion givers should not be asked to render an opinion that covers
compliance by the Company with laws generally," although it does not mention licenses
and permits per se, has the same effect as ABA Guideline I.B(5). TriBar Report, supra note
5, at 661 n.162.
114. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 399-400.
115. In this regard, the TriBar Report notes that delivering a general "compliance with
law" opinion "would require a detailed understanding of a Company's business activities
and could almost never be rendered (assuming it could be rendered at all) without great ex-
pense." TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 661 n. 162.
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The FCC Licenses are not subject to any conditions outside the or-
dinary course [or are subject to the following conditions outside
the ordinary course].
116
As the FCBA Report acknowledges, there are numerous conditions
imposed on a license by the Communications Act and the FCC's rules.
117
The issue posed for the opinion giver here is whether a particular condition
is routine or is "outside the ordinary course." For example, technical con-
ditions on the license of a broadcast station could be entirely benign or so
severely limit the service area as to deprive the licensee of a major portion
of its revenue base. This determination necessarily requires knowledge of
the company's operations. While the Subcommittee elsewhere acknowl-
edges that the opinion giver should not be charged with knowledge of the
company's operations,118 the conditions opinion necessarily requires this
knowledge on the part of the opinion giver. Accordingly, the conditions
opinion should not be given or, at least, should be given only in modified
form. Given the inherently factual nature of the subject, moreover, the ex-
istence vel non of conditions should be addressed as a confirmation or, al-
ternatively, as a representation and warranty by the company in an under-
lying agreement.
F. FCBA Report, Paragraph LF Call Signs
Recommended Language:
The Company has all necessary authority from the FCC to use the
call signs listed on Exhibit A.
N
As the FCBA Report explains, the "call signs" opinion means
"nothing more than that the FCC has assigned that particular call sign to
the station involved. It does not mean that the use of the call sign by the
company is not subject to challenge by third parties under other laws...
.,120 Therefore, given the observations, the Subcommittee correctly con-
cluded that the opinion "is of little, if any, utility. 12' This conclusion also
warrants more than an acknowledgment that "counsel may prefer to put
116. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 400.
117. Id.
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this information in the form of a factual confirmation" ;22 rather, the FCBA
Report should state unequivocally that verifying the authority to use call
signs is not an appropriate subject for a legal opinion. If the information is
of little utility, requesting a legal opinion on the subject wastes resources
and needlessly exposes opinion givers to potential liability.
G. FCBA Report, Paragraph L G Renewal
Recommended Language:
The most recent renewal of the FCC Licenses has been granted by
the Commission in the ordinary course.
The Subcommittee's comments explain their understanding of what
is encompassed in the renewal opinions:
(1) the application for renewal of the licenses held by the Company
was filed in timely fashion; (2) the Commission requested no further
information; (3) no competing applications, petitions to deny, or in-
formal objections were filed before the date that the application was
granted; and (4) the renewal was granted by the Commission staff on
delegated authority for the full-license term without the imposition of
forfeiture, sanctions, or other conditions outside the normal course.
The four enumerated issues clearly are factual in nature. Because a com-
munications lawyer with a historical relationship with the company is
likely a least-cost source of such factual information, the opinion might be
appropriate in certain circumstances. Given the factual nature of the opin-
ion, however, it should be addressed as a confirmation rather than an
opinion.
The ABA Accord approach is in substantial agreement with the analy-
sis of this Article. ABA Accord section 17 discusses opinions concerning
legal proceedings, which require information very similar to the informa-
tion sought in a renewal opinion (e.g., whether pleadings were or were not
filed in the docket).12 The ABA Accord notes that "[w]hile the matter is in-
herently factual, the request is addressed to the Opinion Giver as a likely
source of information relating to the topic.' ' 26 The ABA concludes that a
"legal proceedings" opinion should be furnished as "a factual confirmation
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 401-02.
125. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 213.
126. Id.
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as opposed to a legal opinion."' 27 The ABA Accord approach is superior to
the approach of the FCBA Report.'28
The Subcommittee also offers recommended language for renewal
opinions in the context of (1) applications granted over objections, n9 (2)
pending applications,'" and (3) pending applications subject to objec-
tions. 3 In each case, the renewal opinion still requests essentially factual
information. Thus, the analysis with respect to generic renewal opinions
applies equally well to these special cases noted by the Subcommittee;
they should be addressed, if at all, as confirmations rather than as opinions.
127. Id.
128. The TriBar Report's analysis of the "absence of litigation" opinion is generally
consistent with the ABA Accord, and, hence, with the Authors' analysis of the renewal
opinion. See TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 663-65. See also discussion infra Part VI.
129. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 402.
The application for renewal of the FCC Licenses held by the Company was filed
on [date] and granted on [date] for a period expiring [date]. This is the standard
expiration period pursuant to the FCC's rules. The FCC's rules allowed the filing
of competing applications or petitions to deny on or before [date] and the filing of
informal objections before the date that the application was granted. A
[competing application, petition to deny, or informal objection] was filed on
[date]. The [application, petition, or informal objection] was dismissed [and all is-




An application to renew the FCC Licenses held by the Company was filed on
[date] and remains pending. The FCC's rules permit the filing of competing ap-
plications and petitions to deny on or before [date] and the filing of informal ob-
jections any time up until the date that the application is granted. If no competing
applications or petitions to deny are fied, then the application to renew the li-
censes will be ripe for a grant after [date]. Any informal objections filed while the
application to renew the licenses remains pending would have to be resolved be-
fore the application could be granted.
Id.
131. Id. at 403.
An application to renew the FCC Licenses held by the Company was filed on
[date] and remains pending. The FCC's rules permit the filing of competing ap-
plications or petitions to deny on or before [date] and the filing of informal ob-
jections up until the date that the application is granted. There are no known com-
peting applications, petitions to deny, or informal objections affecting the
application for license renewal on file with the FCC. The application for license
renewal is ripe for a grant, although any informal objections filed while the appli-
cation for renewal of license remains pending would have to be resolved before
the application could be granted.
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V. TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC OPINIONS
A. FCBA Report, Paragraph 1I.A If Consent Is Required
1. Grant of Consent
Recommended Language:
The FCC has granted its consent to the [describe the aspect of
transaction requiring FCC approval, for example, assignment or
transfer of control of the FCC Licenses] without the imposition of
conditions outside the ordinary course or subject to the following
conditions outside the ordinary course).
For the reasons discussed above with respect to conditions on the li-
cense,133 it is not appropriate to request an opinion as to whether the con-
sent is subject to conditions outside the ordinary course. Moreover,
whether the consent has been granted is again a fact-based determination
and, consistent with the ABA Accord,134 should be provided, if at all, as a
factual confirmation, not as a legal opinion.
In some circumstances, such as when the consent has been chal-
lenged, the FCBA Report endorses an opinion that the consent has been
"validly" issued.3 5 For the same reasons that the "licenses validly held"
opinion is not appropriate,16 the "validly issued" opinion is not appropriate
(e.g., it is exceedingly difficult for the opinion giver to determine whether
the FCC complied with its own internal procedures). The opinion is par-
ticularly inappropriate when there is a challenge to the consent because, as
noted in ABA Guidelines paragraph I.B(3), any request for an unexplained
opinion regarding a legal issue of known uncertainty is inappropriate. 37 If
the challenge to the consent has not been finally adjudicated, moreover,
counsel would be unreasonably compelled to opine as to the outcome of
litigation, a task the ABA Guidelines and the TriBar Report agree should
not normally be undertaken in a legal opinion.
38
132. Id.
133. See supra Part IV.E.
134. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 224, para. I.A(1).
135. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 404.
136. See supra Part IV.A, Option 2.
137. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 227, para. I.B(3).
138. Id. at 229, para. I.C(4); TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 664.
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2. Full Force and Effect
Recommended Language:
The FCC's consent is in full force and effect.
139
The Subcommittee's comments on the "full force and effect" opinion
in the context of transaction-specific opinions where consent is required
are virtually identical to its comments in the context of generic opinions
(i.e., the FCC Licenses are in full force and effect).140 As in the context of




The order of the FCC granting its consent was [issued or released]
on [date], and public notice of such consent was given on [date].
The time within which any party in interest other than the FCC
may seek administrative or judicial reconsideration or review [has
expired or expired on {date}], and no petition for such reconsid-
eration or review was timely filed with the FCC or with the appro-
priate court. The time within which the FCC may review the con-
sent on its own motion [has expired or expired on {date}], and the
FCC has not undertaken such review.
The Subcommittee recognizes the difficulty in giving "final order"
opinions or opinions stating that the consent is "'no longer subject to ad-
ministrative or judicial reconsideration or review,"' an observation with
which most communications lawyers would quickly agree.' 42 Rather than
simply suggest that the opinion should not be given, the Subcommittee in-
stead hedges the recommended language to such an extent that it essen-
tially becomes a factual determination. Indeed, the Subcommittee recom-
139. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 405.
140. See supra Part IV.B.
141. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 406.
142. Id. The Subcommittee notes as evidence of the difficulty in giving "final order"
opinions the following two cases: Sunrise Communications, Inc., Letter from Larry D.
Eads, Chief, Audio Services Division, Mass Media Bureau, to Sunrise Communications,
Inc., and Chronicle Broadcasting of Omaha (Jan. 16, 1987); and Letter to Richard M. Riehl,
Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Division, to Richard M. Riehl (June 21,
1985) (on file with the Mass Media Bureau of the FCC). In those two cases, the Mass Me-
dia Bureau discovered procedural irregularities and reconsidered its prior action well after
the standard time period for such reconsideration had expired.
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mends, as part of the opinion giver's due diligence, that he or she inquire
of the FCC's staff or the general counsel's office.14 This action hardly
constitutes legal analysis and only serves to demonstrate that the Subcom-
mittee's recommended language is a factual confirmation, not a legal
opinion. Because the opinion giver is not the least-cost source of these
facts, the opinion should not be given.
The "final order" opinion attempts to give assurance where, unfortu-
nately, none can be given. A communications lawyer reading the opinion
will understand what it attempts to accomplish. However, a business per-
son reading the opinion likely will be lulled into a false sense of security
based on the recommended language. This unjustifiable reliance by the
third party should cause concern for an opinion giver in light of recent case
law and, therefore, is an additional reason not to give the opinion.
4. Sufficiency of Consent
Recommended Language:
Such consent constitutes all necessary consents, approvals, and
authorizations required under the Communications Act for the
[describe FCC aspect of the transaction to be consummated at the
closing, for example, assignment of the FCC licenses to the bor-
rower, transfer of control of the FCC licenses to the borrower,
execution and delivery of the loan documents, funding of the
loan].'4
The "sufficiency of consent" opinion represents an appropriate exer-
cise of professional legal judgment and, thus, the opinion should be given
if requested. The Subcommittee properly notes that various alternative
formulations of this opinion (e.g., "the consent is sufficient 'for the per-
formance by the Company of its obligations under the Agreement"') at-
tempt to broaden its scope. 45 The Subcommittee correctly states that these
broader versions embrace future events and, therefore, are not the proper
subject of a legal opinion.146 The Subcommittee would merely qualify
these broader opinions with limiting language.147 This approach is risky,
and, since the opinion giver is not the least-cost source of this information
concerning future events, the broader opinion should not be given.




147. Id. at 408.
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B. FCBA Report, Paragraph ILB If No Consent Is Necessary
Recommended Language:
No consent, approval, or authorization of, [or filing with], the FCC
is necessary for the [describe transaction to be consummated at the
closing...] [except as described in the agreement].
148
Like the "sufficiency of consent" opinion, a determination that the
transaction does not need FCC approval is an appropriate use of the pro-
fessional skills of a communications practitioner, and therefore, "no con-
sent necessary" is an appropriate opinion to request. It is precisely this
kind of determination that permits a lawyer to add value to a transaction. If
two companies wish to merge, they want to know from whom they must
obtain consent before they proceed to consummate the transaction. Here,
the lawyer's skills can inform them of obstacles that may need to be over-
come before they can proceed. The lawyer is the least-cost source of this
crucial information; therefore, the "no consent necessary" opinion is effi-
ciency enhancing and can be given.
C. FCBA Report, Paragraph HI. C Transaction Does Not Violate
Recommended Language:
The execution and delivery of the agreement, and the performance
by the Company of its obligations under the agreement, will not
violate the Communications Act.
149
Typically, an opinion giver will confirm that execution and delivery
by the company of the agreements do not, and performance by the com-
pany of its obligations under the agreements will not, violate certain provi-
sions of statutory law (e.g., the Communications Act). 50 Like the
"sufficiency of consent" opinion and the "no consent is necessary" opinion
above, this opinion is a proper exercise of a lawyer's professional skills. It
is precisely the issue nervous clients want to resolve before the transaction
is consummated. Furthermore, the company's special communications
counsel is the least-cost source of the information sought. This Article is in
148. Id.
149. Id. at 409.
150. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 210-11.
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agreement with the Subcommittee that a "no violation" opinion properly
can be requested by an opinion recipient.
However, the "transaction does not violate" opinion should not be
understood to address the company's compliance with laws generally. The
opinion is limited in two important respects. First, it covers only the exe-
cution and delivery of the transaction documents and the performance by
. 151
the company of its obligation thereunder. Second, the opinion is ex-
pressly limited to violations of the Communications Act.152 This Article
agrees with the ABA Accord approach that "[i]t is inappropriate for the
Opinion Recipient . . . to request an opinion to the effect that the
[company] is in compliance with all applicable or 'material' laws" of a
specified jurisdiction or scope. Likewise, this Article agrees with the po-
sition in the TriBar Report that "[d]espite its apparent breadth ... the no
violation of law opinion addresses only the law (including published rules
and regulations of government agencies) of jurisdictions that are specified
for coverage in the opinion letter."' 54 The opinion giver typically has no
way of knowing whether all relevant activities of the company are being
conducted in compliance with law, especially in communications opinions
where FCC counsel often is asked to opine with respect to a transaction
where it has no historical relationship with the company. Thus, the
"transaction does not violate" opinion should be given when requested, but
should not be understood to encompass the company's compliance with
laws generally.
155
VI. ABSENCE OF LITIGATION
Recommended Language:
Based upon a review of the public files of the FCC, appropriate
files of this firm [identify with particularity any other information
relied upon...] and an inquiry of lawyers in this firm who have
substantial responsibility for the Company's legal matters handled
by this firm, we confirm that, except as disclosed at [exhibit at-
tached to opinion or schedule to Transaction Document]:
Alternatives:
151. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 409.
152. Id.
153. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 212.
154. TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 661.
155. See also infra Part VII.
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(1) there is no unsatisfied adverse FCC order, decree, or ruling
outstanding against the Company, the Station, or any of the FCC
licenses;
(2) there is no proceeding (including any rulemaking proceeding),
complaint, or investigation against the Company or in respect of
the Station or any of the FCC licenses pending or threatened be-
fore the FCC (including any pending judicial review of such an ac-
tion by the FCC) except for proceedings affecting the [e.g., radio,
television, cable] industry generally, to which the Company is not a
specific party;
(3) the Company is not a party to any complaint, action, or other
proceeding at the FCC, including both complaints against other li-
censees or applicants and rule makings of general applicability;
(4) [the appropriate schedule to the transaction documents] in-
cludes all applications on behalf of the Station or with respect to
the FCC licenses that are now pending before the FCC;
(5) the Company has not been the subject of any final adverse or-
der, decree, or ruling of the FCC (including any notice of forfei-
ture which has been paid) since [specify date, such as the date of
the grant of the last renewal application]; and
(6) no action, suit, proceeding, or investigation is pending or
threatened, and no judgment, order, decree, or ruling has been en-
tered, against the Company in any court or before or by any gov-
ernmental authority (other than the FCC) that gives us reason to
believe that any of the FCC licenses will be revoked or will not be
renewed in the ordinary course.1
56
The Subcommittee acknowledges that information regarding pending
or threatened litigation is "inherently factual" and not "an opinion, of
law."'157 Nevertheless, the Subcommittee rejects the approach of the ABA
Accord and the TriBar Report that this information should be narrow in
scope and require only a very limited amount of due diligence.
5 1
The Subcommittee justifies its divergence on two grounds. First, the
Subcommittee states that it "believes" the opinion giver is the most effi-
156. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 411-12.
157. Id. at 412. The Subcommittee's belief that the confirmation may nevertheless
"require] the exercise of legal judgment" is misplaced; confirming that a proceeding is
pending requires effort, but not legal judgment. Moreover, the FCBA Report's reference to
the "absence of litigation" confirmation options as "opinions" could be misleading. Id.
158. The ABA Accord in paragraph 17.2 states that "[tihe Opinion Giver need do no
more with respect to pending or threatened legal proceedings than confirm information
listed or otherwise provided by the Client to the Opinion Recipient in or pursuant to the
Transaction Documents." ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 213. Similarly, the TriBar Report
states that "[a]s a matter of customary diligence the ['absence of litigation'] opinion does
not require that the opinion preparers check court or other public records or review the
firm's files ... " TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 664.
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cient source of the information.159 Nonetheless, the Subcommittee does not
acknowledge the significantly increased cost to the opinion giver and cli-
ent due to expanded legal proceeding confirmations-costs that may be
prohibitive for those clients involved in a broad range of activities. Sec-
ond, the FCBA Report declares that a confirmation regarding legal pro-
ceedings in the FCC context is "broader in scope and requires more inves-
tigation" than the confirmation request envisioned by the ABA Accord.'
6
Accordingly, it states that to ascertain the existence of legal proceedings,
counsel should review the public records of the FCC (the same files it says
are disorganized and incomplete) and may rely on information supplied by1- .161
the client. However, the Subcommittee does not explain why any legal
judgment is involved or what makes the FCC context different than other
fora.
The FCBA Report suggests some options for this "opinion," such as
whether "any" applications are pending at the FCC, that it later explains,
cannot be delivered "with a great deal of certainty" due to the state of the
FCC's records. 62 Given the Subcommittee's admission that a search of
known sources may not reveal pending applications, it is improbable that
any benefit is derived from such an "opinion," other than, again, trans-
forming the opinion giver into an insurer.
Another option endorsed by the Subcommittee would require the
opinion giver to identify even non-FCC misconduct-a task the Subcom-
mittee acknowledges will likely require questioning all attorneys in theS 163
firm who have worked for the client. Although it also concedes that this
"may be an administratively difficult task in a large firm," it nevertheless
discards this potentially prohibitive obstacle and endorses requests for the
opinion. The Authors disagree with this conclusion and believe that the
administrative costs associated with such a task far outweigh the benefits
to be derived from any opinion based upon it. In sum, the ABA Accord's
approach to "absence of litigation" opinions is more realistic and more ef-
ficient than the FCBA Report approach, and accordingly, the opinion
should be furnished only as a limited factual confirmation and not as a le-
gal opinion. In this regard, the TriBar Report has appropriately concluded
that "in most cases the no litigation opinion could be omitted with no real




163. Id. at 414-15. In contrast, the TriBar Report observes that as a matter of customary
practice, opinion givers do not consult with every lawyer in a firm or review all of the
firm's files as to factual matters. TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 614.
164. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 415.
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loss to opinion recipients if opinion recipients were instead to rely directly
on the Company or its officers for information regarding litigation affect-
ing the transaction and the Company."165
VII. COMPLIANCE WITH LAW
The Subcommittee concludes that a "compliance with law" opinion
should not be requested.1 6 The ABA Accord and the TriBar Report are in•167
agreement. The Subcommittee notes that the scope of Communications
Act regulation is so broad that to require an opinion giver to opine as to
compliance with law would require the opinion giver to engage in an ex-
tensive and fact-intensive investigation. The Subcommittee concludes
that the opinion recipient instead "should rely on the representations of the
Company in the operative documents. ' 69 The FCBA Report, the ABA Ac-
cord, and the TriBar Report have reached the proper conclusion with re-
spect to the "compliance with law" opinion. The opinion giver is not the
least-cost source of the information-the company is-and, therefore,
should not give a "compliance with law" opinion.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The FCBA Report provides a helpful starting point for negotiations
over communications opinions. Further editions of the FCBA Report, how-
ever, should address in greater detail the Subcommittee's reasons for de-
parting from the ABA Accord and the TriBar Report. These departures of-
ten are economically inefficient and, therefore, subtract value from
corporate transactions that are regulated by the FCC. Many FCC legal
opinions are largely factual in nature, and therefore, the opinion giver typi-
cally is not the least-cost source of the information sought. In addition, a
comparison to the ABA Accord and the TriBar Report raises questions as to
whether the FCBA Report strikes a reasonable balance between the needs
of the recipient and the burdens placed on the opinion giver. The ABA Ac-
cord and the TriBar Report generally have adopted the more reasonable as
well as more economically efficient approach. For this reason, and in view
of recent trends in the appellate courts as to the liability of opinion givers,
communications attorneys should adhere more closely to the ABA Accord
165. TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 665.
166. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 416.
167. ABA Accord, supra note 5, at 228, para. I.B(5); TriBar Report, supra note 5, at 661
n.162.
168. FCBA Report, supra note 1, at 416.
169. Id.
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and the TriBar Report than to the FCBA Report when drafting and negoti-
ating legal opinions in corporate transactions regulated by the FCC.
In sum:
1. Except for certain factual confirmations that may be reasonably
requested (e.g., "licenses held," "conditions on licenses," and
"renewal"), none of the non-transaction-specific opinions
should be given (i.e., "full force and effect," "final order,"
"sufficiency of licenses," and "call signs").
2. With respect to transaction-specific opinions (consent re-
quired), only the "sufficiency of consent" and "transaction does
not violate" opinions should be given, and the "full force and
effect" and "final order" opinions should not be given. The
"grant of consent" opinion may be given as a factual confirma-
tion, if required.
3. In connection with transaction-specific opinions, the "no con-
sent is necessary" and "transaction does not violate" opinions
represent a proper use of a lawyer's skills and may be given if
requested. Because the lawyer is a likely source of information
regarding litigation, the "absence of litigation" opinion may be
given, but only as a factual confirmation.
4. Finally, this Article agrees with the FCBA Report, the ABA Ac-
cord, and the TriBar Report approach to a "compliance with
law" opinion-it is overly broad and should not be given.
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